Sex Discrimination (Election Candidates) Bill

The government has published the long-expected Sex Discrimination (Election Candidates) Bill.

It inserts a new section 42A into the Sex Discrimination 1975, which has the effect of disapplying the 1975 Act to any arrangements relating to the right of a registered political party to regulate the selection of that party's election candidates in national, European and local elections.

In other words, it will be permissible for political parties to adopt women-only shortlists, a practice which was previously ruled unlawful.

In order for the exemption to apply, the arrangements must be for the purpose of reducing inequality in the numbers of men and women elected.

The Act (assuming it is enacted) will expire at the end of 2015, unless extended by statutory instrument.

The Bill can be downloaded from here.

House of Lords on Victimisation

House of Lords Opinion - Victimisation under the Race Relations Act 1976

Yesterday (Thursday, 11th October) the House of Lords handed down its decision in Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v Khan, holding that an employer who refuses to provide a reference for an employee who has claimed race discrimination is not necessarily thereby guilty of victimisation.


Facts
Sergeant Khan had applied for, and been refused, promotion to inspector on several occasions within the West Yorkshire police. He lodged a claim with the employment tribunal alleging that the refusal to promote him was on grounds of his race (Indian).

Whilst that claim was pending, he applied for promotion/transfer to the Norfolk police force. The West Yorkshire police refused to provide a reference (after seeking legal advice) on the grounds of the pending litigation. They argued that they were placed in the invidious position of either having to repeat what might be a racially motivated assessment (thereby re-discriminating and possibly giving rise to an award of aggravated damages), or not repeating their previous comments and affecting the Force's credibility in Sergeant Khan's discrimination case.


Issue
By refusing to provide a reference because of a pending race discrimination claim, was the police force guilty of victimisation?


Decision
The House of Lords unanimously held that the police force was not guilty of victimisation.

Lord Nicholls pointed out that a finding of unlawful victimisation would mean that West Yorkshire police should have given Norfolk police a reference which have repeated the very views which were being challenged in pending judicial proceedings in the industrial tribunal as evidence of unlawful racial discrimination. This, said Lord Nicholls, "is a surprising proposition. To my mind it has only to be spelled out for it to be apparent that this cannot be right". He went on to say that "Employers, acting honestly and reasonably, ought to be able to take steps to preserve their position in pending discrimination proceedings without laying themselves open to a charge of victimisation".

The question which mattered was therefore "was Sergeant Khan refused a reference by reason that he had brought proceedings against the chief officer of police under this Act?"

The House of Lords said the answer was no. The reason why West Yorkshire Police refused to give a reference was NOT because Sergeant Khan had brought proceedings against them but because they were advised by their in-house legal department that it would be inappropriate to give a reference because there was pending litigation raising relevant issues. In traditional legal language, the institution of proceedings by Sgt Khan was a causa sine qua non of the refusal to give a reference but it was not the causa causans of that refusal.

Lord Mackay said that "once proceedings have been commenced, a new relationship is created between the parties. They are not only employer and employee but also adversaries in litigation. The existence of that adversarial relationship may reasonably cause the employer to behave in a way which treats the employee less favourably than someone who had not commenced such proceedings" and suggested that "a test which is likely in most cases to give the right answer is to ask whether the employer would have refused the request if the litigation had been concluded, whatever the outcome".

The House of Lords also considered who the correct comparator should be. Lord Scott stated that "the treatment of Sergeant Khan should be compared to the treatment that would have been accorded to an officer in a position the same in all respects as Sergeant Khan's save only that this hypothetical officer had not done the protected act, ie, in this case, had not brought race discrimination proceedings... It provides to employees who do one or other of the protected acts specified in section 2(1) the protection that Parliament must have intended them to have."


Thanks to Henry Scrope of DiscLaw Publishing (www.emplaw.co.uk) for sending me his summary of this case (which I have shamelessly plagiarised).

New TUPE decision

NEW TUPE DECISION

An important - and perhaps controversial - EAT decision considering when a TUPE transfer occurs. The case is reported on the EAT website.

CELTEC LTD -v- ASTLEY + others
(EAT, Hooper J. presiding, 5th October 2001))

Facts
Prior to 1990, vocational training and enterprise activities were managed by the Department of Education. In 1989, the government announced the creation of Training and Enterprise Councils (known as TECs). Approximately 80 TECs were set up, using (in the main) the same premises, databases and staff as had been doing the job under the Department of Education. They took over the Department of Education's existing contracts with suppliers and other third parties.

This case was concerned with the North Wales TEC, which began operations in about September 1990. In common with the other TECs, it was a company limited by guarantee and was initially staffed by civil servants, previously working for the Department of Education, who were seconded out for a 3-year period to the TEC. The terms of secondment provided that they continued to be civil servants and that, at the end of the period, they could extend the period of secondment or return to normal civil service duties.

In September 1991 the government decided to end the secondments and arrange for staff to be directly employed by the TECs. Following a period of consultation, all staff were offered the opportunity to return to the civil service at the end of their secondment, or resign from the civil service and enter into contracts of employment with the TEC. Many employees, including the Respondents to this appeal, adopted the latter option. The three in question, who brought their claims as test cases, resigned and entered into new contracts in about October 1993 (although the process extended until 1996 for other employees).


Issue
It was common ground at the appeal that a TUPE transfer took place. The question was, when did it occur?

If the TUPE transfer took place in September 1990, then "at the time of the transfer" (being the wording in ERA 1996, s218, dealing with continuity of employment) the employees were, and remained, employees of the Department of Employment. Thus s218 would not grant them continuity of employment.

If, however, the TUPE transfer was a gradual process occurring between September 1990 and October 1996 (as the staff transferred), then the employees would have retained continuity of employment for their years spent with the civil service.


Decision
The majority of the EAT (including Hooper J.) held that the correct test for the timing of the transfer is "when the new employer takes over the actual occupation and control of the old business". This occurred in September 1990, and thus the employees remained employed by the Department of Employment after the transfer. Thus continuity of employment was not preserved.

The minority member agreed with the decision of the original tribunal, holding that the transfer took place over a period of six years and was effected by a series of transactions, ie the transfers of the individual employees.

The EAT granted permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal without recalling the parties for argument - thus acknowledging the importance/complexity of the point.

[Thanks to John Bowers QC of Littleton Chambers, Counsel for the successful TEC, for sending me this transcript.]