Thursday, 22 March 2001

Aiding Racial Discrimination - House of Lords

CASE 2: Anyanwu (+ another) -v- South Bank Student Union (+ another)
(http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200001/ldjudgmt/jd010322/anyanw-1.htm)

It deals with the issue of liability under section 33(1) of the Race Relations Act 1976, which provides:

"33(1) A person who knowingly aids another person to do an act made unlawful by this Act shall be treated for the purposes of this Act as himself doing an unlawful act of the like description."

FACTS
The Appellants, Messrs Anyanwu and Ebuzoeme, were students at South Bank University. They were elected as full-time officers of the South Bank Student Union, and were employed by the Union.

Various allegations of misuse of funds and bullying were raised against them by the University (not the Union). Following a disciplinary hearing, they were expelled from the University and banned from entering University premises. Accordingly their employment as officers of the Union ceased (it was not clear whether this was due to an express dismissal or frustration, but this was immaterial to the point before the House of Lords).


THE CLAIMS
The Appellants brought claims under the Race Relations Act 1976 against the Union, as employer, and against the University for knowingly aiding the employer to commit an unlawful act, under RRA 1976 s.33(1).

On an application to strike out the claims, the employment tribunal struck out the claim against the University, the EAT reinstated it, the Court of Appeal struck it out again, and the House of Lords (for the reasons set out below) re-reinstated it!


THE REASONING
The phrase 'knowingly aids' in section 33 did not imply that the University had to desire, intend, aim for or bring about the dismissal of the Appellants. All it meant was that the 'aider' had "given some kind of assistance to the other person which helps him do it. The amount or value of that help or assistance is of no importance. Nor is the time at which it is given. It may or may not have been necessary. All that is needed is an act of some kind, done knowingly, which helps the other person to do the unlawful act." (per Lord Hope)

Lord Bingham identified a 3-stage test:
(1) what is the act of the [student union] which is made unlawful by the Act, which it is said that [the University] knowingly aided the [student union] to do?

(2) what is it alleged that [the university] did which knowingly aided the doing of that unlawful act by [the student union]?

(3) do those allegations, if fully established, bring the Appellants complaints against [the university] within section 33(1) of the Act?

By contrast, Lord Hope postulated a 2-stage test:

(1) what was the act done by [the Union] which was made unlawful by the Act?

(2) did the act which is in question aid [the Union] to do that act?
In short, the House of Lords held that the expulsion of the Appellants did 'aid' the Union in dismissing them. This is because if they had not been expelled, they would not have been dismissed.


COMMENT
This is a very wide interpretation of section 33, apparently relying on little more than a causal link between the discriminatory act and liability for the person who 'knowingly aids'. It does not require that the person aiding should have any knowledge that the end result of the principal's acts will be unlawful under the Race Relations Act. Under this test, it would seem that an employment agency who introduced Mr Racist as an employee to a new company will be liable for his racist acts. The decision makes almost turns liability under the Race Relations Act 1976 into a strict liability for the acts of third parties.

One suspects that subsequent courts will restrict this case to its facts. Indeed, this is already being seen in the next decision, Hallam (below).


CASE 3: Hallam v Cheltenham Borough Council (+ others)
(http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200001/ldjudgmt/jd010322/hallam-1.htm)

This case is on exactly the same point as Anyanwu, above, but on a wholly different set of facts.

FACTS
The Appellant contracted with the local council to hire a hall for her daughter's wedding. Her husband was of Romany gypsy origin, and her daughter (obviously!) was half-gypsy.

The police, who had suffered problems with local gipsies some months earlier, advised the Council that they were concerned about the risk of disorder. The Council therefore insisted that all guests hold tickets. The Appellant refused, booked another venue, and successfully sued the Council for repudiatory breach of contract, and racial discrimination.

THE CLAIM
In addition to her claim against the Council, she brought a claim of 'knowingly aiding' a racial act against the police officers.


THE TRIAL JUDGE
The trial judge held that there needs to be an element of "joint enterprise", and the police fell short of knowingly aiding the Council to racially discriminate.


THE DECISION
In what is probably the shortest House of Lords judgment I have ever seen, the House sets out the facts and refers to Anyanwu, its previous decision, as containing the law.

It then states, without any analysis, that the trial judge's decision was one that was open to him on the facts. It does not seem to have any difficulty in reconciling the trial judge's finding that there must be an element of joint enterprise, with its own views in Anyanwu to the effect that the 'aider' does not need to know of the consequences of its 'aiding' act, or that the principal is about to commit a discriminatory act.

COMMENT
Anyanwu seems to be a case of hard facts making bad law - and the House of Lords already seems to be retreating from this statement of the law in Hallam. Yet there is now a very clear conflict of guidance for tribunals when deciding questions under section 33 of the Race Relations Act. Wet towel time, perhaps?

Tuesday, 20 March 2001

First Human Rights case in the EAT?

The EAT has, this morning, handed down its decision in what is thought to be the first case focussing on the application of the Human Rights Act 1998. By coincidence, it comes on the same day as the Lord Chancellor's Department issues a press release stating that the Human Rights Act has caused "no significant impact" on the courts.

The case is De Keyser Ltd. v Miss L Wilson (EAT/1438/00). The offical transcript is not yet available, but should be available soon from the EAT website.

Facts: The Applicant claimed constructive dismissal arising from stress at work. The Respondent instructed a doctor to examine her. The letter of instruction (which, as the EAT takes great pains to point out, was written by an employment consultant and not a solicitor!) was couched in very strong terms, setting out in great detail aspects of the Applicant's private life which the Respondent believed to be the cause of her stress. There was little doubt that the letter contained highly intrusive and sensitive information, but it was common ground that the employer had not been told the information in confidence, nor as part of the discovery process during litigation.

The Applicant objected to the letter, and asked the tribunal to direct that a fresh expert be appointed. The tribunal, of its own motion, called the parties for a hearing as to why the Notice of Appearance should not be struck out. Following the hearing, the tribunal struck out the IT3 on grounds that "the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted on behalf of the Respondent [have] been scandalous and in breach of article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) ECHR and the Human Rights Act 1998".

The Respondent appealed.

Issue: Was the tribunal right in striking out the Notice of Appearance because the Respondent had breached the Applicant's right to respect for her private life, contained in ECHR Art. 8?

Decision: No. Lindsay P. considered that the tribunal was wrong to have struck out the IT3. The following factors were central:

• the letter of instruction was sent a week prior to the Human Rights Act 1998 coming into force;
• it did not contain any information given in confidence, but (although the decision is not entirely clear on this) only information in the public domain;
• the Respondent was not a public authority;
• it was open to the tribunal to direct that another expert be instructed - thus the fact that the doctor might have been irretrevably prejudiced was not fatal;
• most importantly, the tribunal had not expressly considered whether a fair trial of the issues was still possible;
• there was no disobedience to a court order (although the relevance of this to an article 8 argument is not entirely clear);
• the right to respect for privacy is qualified by the right to both parties to have a just trial of the issues between them - and it must be borne in mind that it was the Applicant who invoked the right to such a trial by bringing the claim
Accordingly the EAT re-instated the IT3.

The decision is also important because it gives a 13-point guide to instructing an expert in employment tribunals. They are (summarised):
1. give careful thought as to whether to instruct an expert at all - a prudent party will first explore the need for expert evidence with the tribunal in correspondence or at a directions hearing;
2. the joint instruction of a single expert is the preferred course;
3. if a joint instruction occurs, the parties must agree responsibility for fees/expenses. It is perfectly acceptable to agree to bound by the tribunal's subsequent views;
4. if one side will not agree to share fees/expenses, it is legitimate for the other side to instruct somebody themselves - although the weight may be reduced if they do not send the instruction letter to the other side for comment;
5. if a joint expert is to be used, tribunals may fix a timetable for agreeing the identity of, and instructions to, the expert;
6. letters of instruction should be detailed and set out specific questions;
7. letters of instruction should avoid partisanship and should emphasise the expert's overriding duty to the court;
8. if the identity of a joint expert, or the wording of instructions, cannot be agreed, the tribunal may assist;
9. the tribunal may give directions as to the areas to be covered by expert evidence;
10. where there is no joint expert, the tribunal should specify a timetable for disclosure/exchange of reports;
11. a timetable might provide for the raising of supplementary questions to the expert;
12. the tribunal should encourage 'without prejudice' meetings of separate experts, to narrow the issued and produce Schedules of points of agreement/dispute;
13. if a party fails to follow these guidelines, the tribunal may consider whether there has been unreasonable conduct within the meaning of rule 12 (as to costs).

Comment: This decision demonstrates the robust approach of the EAT to Human Rights points. As expected (by me, anyway!), the impact of the Human Rights Act has not been significant to date in employment disputes. The EAT is making it quite clear that parties should not take technical 'human rights' points, and that the overriding question is whether justice can be done between the parties.

Slightly worryingly, however, the EAT comes very close to suggesting that a person waives his/her right to respect for privacy simply by bringing a claim in which their private life may be relevant.

Tuesday, 13 March 2001

Employment Agency Worker not Employee (CA decision)

The Court of Appeal has handed down its decision in Montgomery v Johnson Underwood Ltd. (CA, 9.3.2001), on the issue of whether a worker for an employment agency is employed by the agency (for the purpose of claiming unfair dismissal).

Mrs Montgomery signed up with Johnson Underwood (an employment agency) and was assigned to work for X Ltd. as a receptionist. She worked for X Ltd. for almost 2 1/2 years, being paid by Johnson Underwood ('JU'). X Ltd. eventually asked JU to terminate the assignment because they were dissatisfied with the number of personal phone calls she was making. Mrs Montgomery claimed unfair dismissal against both JU and X Ltd.

The Employment Tribunal, as upheld by the a majority of the EAT, held that Mrs Montgomery was employed by JU but not by X Ltd.. NOTE: The EAT decision was summarised in my bulletin of 6th May 2000.

The Court of Appeal disagreed, and reversed the finding of the ET and EAT. It stated that Mrs Montgomery was not an employee of the employment agency. There had been no appeal against the finding that she was not an employee of X Ltd.. Thus Mrs Montgomery is left without any remedy.

The reasoning of the Court of Appeal is as follows:

• the first 2 of the 3 steps set out by McKenna J. in Ready Mixed Concrete v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance, ie mutuality of obligation (as developed by the House of Lords in Carmichael) and control, are the irreducible minimum for finding a contract of employment exists.

• In other words, mutuality and control are not factors amounting to "material for the melting pot" - they are the two "basic and essential facts". If either of these are lacking, there cannot be a contract of employment as a matter of law.

• The employment tribunal found as a fact that JU lacked control over Mrs Montgomery. Accordingly she was incapable of being an employee.

• Obiter: it is likely that, in these circumstances, there is sufficient mutuality of obligation. The agency is obliged to pay, and the worker obliged to work for the agency's client.

The Court of Appeal echoed the EAT's call for legislative intervention into the status of agency workers, so as to clarify whether parliament intended agency workers to be covered by unfair dismissal legislation.

A final note for those who occasionally feel frustrated at delays in the EAT: Brooke LJ was highly critical of the delays to this case which occurred at EAT level, and commented that it "besmirch[ed] the administration of justice." He directed that his criticisms be sent to the President of the EAT so that he can consider what administrative steps need to be taken to "ensure that the law's delays do not cause so much hardship in future."

The decision can be downloaded from http://wood.ccta.gov.uk/courtser/judgements.nsf/6ff876ba66f8361a8025683c00411386/acc5fbc95fac82a580256a0d00581fec/$FILE/montogmery_v_underwood.htm

Monday, 5 March 2001

Extension to Disability Discrimination Act

The government has today announced that it will be extending the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 to include:

• increased protection for people with cancer (the quoted example being people in remission from cancer, who may not fall within the definition of a disabled person);

• removing some of the excluded sectors from the Act, such as police, firemen and prison officers. It will also cover barristers(!), pupil barristers and employees on board ships, aeroplanes or hovercrafts;

• a legal duty on public bodies to provide equal opportunities for disabled persons;

• persons registered as partially sighted being DEEMED to be disabled (and not having to come within the normal definition);

• abolition of the 'small employer' exemption by October 2004 (employers with less than 15 employees are currently excluded from the DDA). Nnote that the EC Equal Treatment Framework Directive requires the small-employer exemption to be abolished by December 2006 - thus the proposals go slightly further than the government's obligations.

Increase in National Minimum Wage

The rumours have been confirmed!

The government has announced that it is to increase the national minimum wage from £3.70 to £4.10 in October 2001, following the Low Pay Commission's recommendation.

It will then increase another 10p to £4.20 in October 2002.

No increase for young workers (18-21 years old) has been announced - thus it presumably remains stable at £3.20 per hour.

The EOC has issued a press release welcoming these increases. I have not yet seen any press releases from the CBI or similar bodies, but they objected to the recommendations of the Low Pay Commission and lobbied against the proposed increases.

More information is available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/er/nmw/

Fixed Term Employee Regulations 2001

The government yesterday (Friday) issued a consultation paper and draft Regulations on its proposals for new rights for fixed term employees. Responses to the consultation paper are sought by 31st May 2001.

The proposals seek to implement the EC Directive on Fixed Term Working 1999 (which required member states to introduce legislation by 10th July 1999!).

The draft Fixed Term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2001, upon which the government is consulting, contain the following provisions for fixed-term employees:

• fixed-term employees are defined as employees (or ex-employees) who worked under a contract of employment which was fixed for a term in advance, or was agreed to terminate upon the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of a specified event;

• a fixed-term employee has the right not to be treated less favourably than a comparable non-fixed term employee engaged in the same or broadly similar work, either in connection with terms and conditions of employment or being subjected to a detriment. There is a defence of objective justification, and the level of pay is excluded (one of the particular points the government is consulting over);

• a fixed term employee who suspects less favourable treatment can ask for written reasons for that treatment. If the employer fails to provide written reasons, a tribunal is entitled to draw an adverse inference (for a change!)

• A NOVEL PROPOSAL: An employee working under a fixed term contract has a right to be notified by the employer of any suitable available vacancies (ie non fixed-term) that may arise.

• The usual remedies for breach of rights: declaration, recommendation or compensation. Compensation is unlimited, having regard to the employee's loss, but no award shall be made for injury to feelings.

• IMPORTANT: Where a employer renews a fixed term contract, and the employee has been working for 4 years (or more) under a series of fixed-term contracts, it is deemed by law to become an indefinite contract and the attempt to fix the term is void. Note that this is not retrospective - any continuity of employment prior to the Regulations coming into force shall not count. This proposal (particularly whether 4 years is appropriate) is another of the central questions being asked in the consultation document.

More information, including the draft Regulations, the EC Directive and the consultation document, is available from http://www.dti.gov.uk/er/fixed/index.htm

Thursday, 1 March 2001

House of Lords - When is a Compromise Agreement not a Compromise Agreement?

A very surprising, and highly controversial, judgment has been handed down today (1st March) by the House of Lords in the case of BCCI (In compulsory liquidation) v (1) Munawar Ali, (2) Sultana Runi Khan and Ors - yet another twist to the BCCI saga.

The decision is concerned with the scope/interpretation of COT3 compromise agreements signed by ex-staff of the bank, via ACAS.

In consideration for one month's salary offered by the bank, and after an interview with an ACAS official, the employees signed a COT3 agreement stating that the payment was:

"…in full and final settlement of all or any claims whether under statute, Common Law or in Equity of whatsoever nature that exist or may exist and in particular, all or any claims, rights or applications of whatsoever nature that the Applicant has or may have or has made or could make in or to the Industrial Tribunal, except the Applicant's rights under the Respondent's pension scheme"

Clear? One would have thought so. But the House of Lords disagrees by a 4:1 majority (Lord Hoffman dissenting). It held that the wording of this clause did not preclude the employees from proceeding with claims for 'stigma' damages arising from the collapse of the bank and their dismissal.

In the leading judgement, Lord Bingham held that:

"it is no part of the court's function to frustrate the intentions of contracting parties once these have been objectively ascertained. But …in the absence of clear language, the court will be very slow to infer that a party intended to surrender rights and claims of which he was unaware and could not have been aware" (paras. 9 -10).

Whilst this is put forward as a cautionary principle not a rule of law (para. 17), it led him to conclude that the parties did not intend:

"to provide for the release of rights and the surrender of claims which they could never have had in contemplation at all." (para. 19)

Lord Nicholls also holds that the applicant in singing cannot reasonably be regarded as having taken on himself the risk of a subsequent retrospective change in the law.

The House did not deal in any detail with the traditional view that parties were not entitled to avoid the plain and obvious meaning of a clause by reason of a mutual mistake as to the law (ie the existence of a right to claim stigma damages).

Two passages may make employment lawyers raise their eyebrows even further:

• Lord Nicholls described the signing of a COT3 agreement as an "informal release" - which seems rather at odds with the fact that it is a legally binding agreement under statute;

• Lord Nicholls also stated that the wording of the COT3 would probably not be sufficient to have compromised a claim for underpayment of wages ("What if it later came to light that due to a clerical error Mr. Naeem had been significantly underpaid while employed? It would be surprising if Mr. Naeem could not pursue such a claim") - para. 35.

Lord Bingham concluded his leading judgment by stating:

"On a fair construction of this document I cannot conclude that the parties intended to provide for the release of rights and the surrender of claims which they could never have had in contemplation at all. If the parties had sought to achieve so extravagant a result they should in m opinion have used language which left no room for doubt..."

One wonders what wording would suffice!

Tuesday, 27 February 2001

EOC Equal Pay Taskforce Report



The Equal Opportunities Commissions has, this morning, published its seminal taskforce report on Equal Pay - www.eoc.org.uk

The report, which is well worth reading for anybody practising in discrimination law, highlights the following issues:

• the gap between average hourly earnings for men and women working full-time has narrowed from 31% to 18%, but the gap between hourly earnings of women working part-time and men working full-time has hardly changed at all, it being 39%.

• the averages hide a stark contrast between earnings of professional women, which are rising, and the growing number of women trapped in part time, low paid jobs.

• average hourly earnings for women in some minority ethnic groups are lower still than for white women, and disabled women have lower average hourly earnings than women who are not disabled.

• the UK has the widest gender pay gap of all EC states.


The taskforce report identifies three main causes of unequal pay:

"Women now do as well as or even better than men in terms of educational achievement; the sexes enter higher education in equal proportions, and women’s employment is catching up with men’s (69%, compared to 79%). There are complex reasons why the gap in earnings persists despite this progress, which can be broken down into three areas:.
• sex discrimination in pay systems, which accounts for 25-50% of the gender pay gap...
• women are concentrated in low paid jobs such as shop assistants, teachers, secretaries and nurses
• women still take prime responsibility for childcare, so many go into part-time jobs, which are usually badly-paid

Finally, the report makes a number of recommendations (including changes to the law, changes to the tribunal system and employer training).

The full report will be available later in the year.

Friday, 16 February 2001

Age Discrimination

The government yesterday confirmed that it would be introducing legislation to tackle age discrimination at work (although it will be the next parliament -whoever it is - that brings in the legislation).

This is pursuant to the EC Equal Treatment Framework Directive that requires all member states to prohibit age discrimination in employment by December 2006 (see bulletin 5/12/00).

An 'Age Advisory Group' was also announced yesterday, which has been set up to advise the government. The first step, after the Group's initial report, will to be embark on a wide consultation procedure to determine the scope of legislation. The government has postulated that such legislation might include outlawing internal corporate retirement ages if they are lower than the state retirement age.

Thursday, 8 February 2001

Two important ECJ cases

CONTENTS
1. ECJ decision - An Employer's Right to Insist on Overtime
2. ECJ Advocate General Opinion - 13 week rule for holiday entitlement unlawful

________________________________________

1. ECJ - An Employer's Right to Insist on Overtime

The ECJ this morning gave its decision in Wolfgang Lange v Georg Schunemann GmbH, a case referred by the German national courts.

Mr Lange was dismissed because he refused to work overtime. There was a dispute of fact over what had been agreed - however, the national court referred three questions to the ECJ for a ruling.

1. Are employers OBLIGED to state in the statement of terms and conditions that an employee may be required to work overtime?
Answer: Yes. Directive 91/533 sets out the employer's obligations to inform employees of the conditions applicable to the contract or employment relationship. Although a right to insist on overtime does not fall within the requirement to inform an employee of the length of their normal working week (since overtime, by definition, is not part of the normal working week), it does fall within the obligation to notify employees of "the essential elements of the contract of employment relationship", because an obligation to work overtime is an essential element of the employment relationship. NOTE: UK Law probably complies with this already under ERA 1996, s1(4)(c).
2. If the employer does NOT set out the obligation to work overtime in writing, does it nullify the obligation? In other words, is the contract does not mention overtime, is the employee in breach of contract if s/he refuses to work overtime.
Answer: No. If the employee has agreed to work overtime (eg verbally or by conduct), and for some reason it has not been reduced to writing, this does NOT render the contractual term void.
3. If the employer does not provide a written statement containing the obligation to work overtime, and is therefore in breach of the law, is the employer deemed to be obstructing the proper taking of evidence (which has consequences in German law)?
Answer: No (this isn't really relevant to UK law!)

The decision is at http://europa.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/gettext.pl?lang=en&num=79989791C19990350&doc=T&ouvert=T&seance=ARRET&where=()

________________________________________

2. ECJ - 13 week rule for holiday entitlement unlawful

The Advocate-General has this morning handed down his opinion in BECTU v UK.

It is common knowledge that regulation 13(7) provides that workers do not acquire the right to 4 weeks' annual paid leave until they have been working for 13 weeks.

BECTU (the Broadcastin, Entertainment, Cinematographic and Theatre Union) has 30,000 members in the broadcasting, film and theatre sector - many of whom work under very short contracts and thus do not acquire the right to paid holiday. They brought a claim in the High Court seeking a declaration that regulation 13(7) was incompatible with the Working Time Directive. They also sought clarification of whether, once the 13 week period had elapsed, that 13 weeks was to be taken into account when calculating how much paid leave the worker was entitled to.

The Advocate-General, in a very clear and forceful opinion, has stated that the 13-week qualification period is unlawful. The right to paid holiday is "an automatic and unconditional right granted to every worker.". There is no provision within the Directive to make it subject to any qualification period. The Directive "precludes national legislation under which a worker does not begin to accrue rights to the paid annual leave...until he has completed a qualifying period of employment with the same employer even if, once that qualifying period has been completed, his employment during the qualifying period is taken into account for the purpose of computing his leave entitlement."

The opinion is at http://europa.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/gettext.pl?lang=en&num=79989791C19990173&doc=T&ouvert=T&seance=CONCL&where=()

Part Time Pensioners - Preston v Wolverhampton HA (House of Lords)

This afternoon the House of Lords handed down its opinion in Preston v Wolverhampton HA (see bulletins 16/5/00 for the ECJ decision, and 15/9/99 for the original reference from the House of Lords).

The House of Lords followed the ECJ ruling, in that:

(1) the 6-month time limit for bringing a claim for backdated pensions under the Equal Pay Act 1970 was lawful (under EPA 1970, s2(4), a claim must be brought within 6 months of the end of employment); but,

(2) the 2-year backdating limitation (EPA 1970, s2(5)) was not compatible with Article 119, and thus part-time pensioners would be entitled to back-date their pension claims to 8th April 1976 (the date of the ECJ's decision in Defrenne v Sabena, when it was held that Article 119 had direct effect).
And an additional point:
(1) Where there is a series of employment contracts of limited length, within a "stable employment relationship", the claim has to be presented within 6 months of the expiry of the last of those contracts - not within 6 months of each contract coming to an end. This is of importance for professions such as schoolteachers. However, when a worker works on an occasional basis under a series of contracts, but in the absence of a "stable employment relationship", she must bring a claim within 6 months of the end of each particular contract of employment.

The decision is on the internet at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200001/ldjudgmt/jd010208/presto-1.htm

Wednesday, 7 February 2001

New SI: Increase in Deposits

Yesterday the government published The Employment Tribunals (Increase of Maximum Deposit) Regulations 2001.

As we had been forewarned (see bulletin 27/11/00), the power for tribunals to order an Applicant to pay a is being increased from a maximum of £150 to a maximum of £500.

The change comes into force on 23rd February 2001.

The statutory instrument is available at http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2001/20010237.htm

Friday, 2 February 2001

Sellars Arenascene v Connolly - C of A

CONTENTS
1. Sellars Arenascene Ltd. v Connolly - Court of Appeal
2. Beuvale Furnishings Ltd. v Chapman - EAT

________________________________________

1. Sellars Arenascene Ltd. v Connolly (CA, 2.2.01)

A decision of the Court of Appeal, handed down this morning.

Issue: Is a controlling shareholder capable of being an employee, for the purpose of the unfair dismissal legislation?

The employment tribunal held that Mr Connolly was not an employee of company X (which, following a series of TUPE transfers and a change of name, became Sellars Arenascene Ltd.) because he was the controlling shareholder. In particular, he was "an accomplished and expert entrepeneur operating a number of businesses", he "retained overall control", and he "behaved as an employee but had an interest as shareholder over and above that of employee and stood to gain if the company prospered."

The Court of Appeal, upholding the decision of the EAT, overturned the employment tribunal's finding and held that Mr Connolly was an employee.

It held that, although ultimately a question of fact, the employment tribunal was clearly wrong to regard the above factors as being inconsistent with employment. Many senior employees are accomplished and expert entrepeneurs. Many senior employees have control of a company, and many senior employees stand to gain if a company prospers. These factors were not inconsistent with employment and, the tribunal having misdirected itself, the Court of Appeal thought it appropriate to substitute its own view.



________________________________________

2. Beauvale Furnishings Ltd. v Chapman

This case is unreported. The transcript can be found at http://wood.ccta.gov.uk/eat/eatjudgments.nsf.

Beauvale Furnishings Ltd. v Chapman [29.11.2000, HHJ Reid QC]
A bold decision of the EAT on illegality of contracts of employment. The parties agreed that the employee would be 'labelled' a self-employed consultant, despite being an employee in reality. This was so the employee could continue claiming legal aid in a personal matter, and could defer payment of income tax and pay the lower class 4 NI contributions. In fact the Applicant then failed to declare his income to the revenue. The EAT held that the deliberate mislabelling as 'self-employed' tainted the contract with illegality and thus prevented him claiming unfair dismissal.

Monday, 29 January 2001

Government launches 'Equality Direct'

The government has today launched 'Equality Direct' - an information and advice service for businesses on a whole range of equality issues such as providing better access for disabled people or equal pay. The telephone advice centre and supporting website will help employers resolve management issues, offer information and advice on both good practice and the law and provide information on effective equal opportunities strategies.

The service is provided in collaboration with DLA.

It can be reached via 0845 600 3444 or, apparently, via www.equalitydirect.org.uk (although when I tried at 2.00pm, it stated the website was 'under development').

Friday, 26 January 2001

Oy Liikenne Ab v Liskojarvi - Big new ECJ TUPE case!!!

Instructions on how to subscribe to this bulletin appear at the bottom of this Email.

Yesterday (25th Jan) the ECJ handed down its decision in the TUPE case Oy Liikenne Ab v Liskojarivi & Juntunen, a case referred by the Supreme Court of Finland.

In summary, the ECJ follows Suzen and emphasises the need for the transfer of assets or, where there are few/no assets, the transfer of a significant part of the workforce. It relies heavily on Suzen and emphasises sections of the decision in Suzen that the English courts have been moving away from.


Facts
The Greater Helsinki Council tendered for the right to run seven local bus routes. The outgoing contractor lost the contract, and it was awarded to Oy Liikenne Ab ('the incoming contractor').

The outgoing contractor owned 26 buses and dismissed 45 people. The incoming contractor bought its own buses - ie not taking over the outgoing contractor's buses - and re-engaged all 33 of the 45 drivers who applied (hiring another 18 of their own) on less favourable terms. It therefore took over a majority of the workforce but no assets, with the exception of buying some (not all) of the bus drivers' uniforms from the outgoing contractor.


Issues
The incoming contractor argued that there was no transfer of undertaking because:
(a) it had no contractual relationship with the outgoing contractor, and there was no third party whom the undertaking could transfer 'through' because the Greater Helsinki Council never operated the bus routes;

(b) a bus route, or a group of routes, does not amount to an 'economic entity';

(c) the assets of the outgoing contractor were not taken over by the incoming contractor;

(d) the drivers who were engaged were taken over at their own request - the incoming contractor was free to hire who it wanted; and,

(e) because there is mandatory competitive tendering in the transport sector (under EC Directive 92/50), it is undesirable to apply the traditional transfer of undertaking approach because it acts as a disincentive to contractors in the tendering process.

Decision
Adopting the same enumeration:
(a) the absence of a direct contractual relationship may point to the lack of a transfer, but it is not conclusive;

(b) see below

(c) see below

(d) see below

(e) the aim of the Acquired Rights Directive is to protect the interests of workers when there is a change of ownership of an economic entity. The fact that this is pursuant to a competitive tendering exercise does not detract from that purpose - Directive 92/50 is not intended to exempt service providers from obligations that apply to all other employers. Contractors can take the effect of the Acquired Rights Directive into account when putting their tenders together.

The important part of the decision was the guidance on what is an economic entity, and whether a transfer has taken place. The court held:
(i) "the transfer must relate to a stable economic entity whose activity is not limited to performing one specific works contract...The term 'entity' thus refers to an organised grouping of persons and assets facilitating the exercise of an economic activity which pursues a specific objective." (para. 31)

COMMENT: this is a strong statement following Suzen, indicating that a mere grouping of staff, without any assets, for the purpose of a specific contract, may not be enough to amount to an 'undertaking' within the meaning of TUPE. However, the court then goes on to contradict itself - see (iii) below.

(ii) "...the degree of importance to be attached to the various criteria for determining whether or not there has been a transfer...will necessarily vary according to the activity carried on, and indeed the production or operating methods employed in the relevant undertaking, business or part of a business." (para. 35)

COMMENT: the court does recognise that some entities may be more person-orientated than asset-orientated, which should be taken into account when deciding whether there has been a transfer, but this does not seem to be relevant to the issue of WHETHER there is a discrete economic entity in the first place.

(iii) "The Court has indeed held that an economic entity may, in certain sectors, be able to function without any significant tangible or intangible assets, so that the maintenance of the identity of such an entity following the transaction affecting it cannot, logically, depend on the transfer of such assets." (para. 37)

COMMENT: This does not rest easily with the paragraph quoted at (i) above - however, this paragraph does reflect recent thinking on what constitutes an economic entity. It supports the argument that a person-orientated undertaking can transfer despite the lack of transfer of any assets.

(iv) "The Court has thus held that, since in certain sectors in which activities are based essentially on manpower, a group of workers engaged in a joint activity on a permanent basis may constitute an economic entity, it must be recognised that such an entity is capable of maintaing its identity after it has been transferred where the new employer does not merely pursue the activity in question but also takes over a major part, in terms of their numbers and skills, of the employees specially assigned by his predecessor to that task..." (para. 38)

COMMENT: This is following the controversial element of Suzen, and uses almost identical wording to the equally controversial passage in Hernandez . It suggests that, in a person-orientated undertaking, the fact that the putative transferee does NOT take on any of the staff means that there is no transfer of an undertaking. No thought is given by the ECJ for the possibility of a putative transferee deliberately avoiding taking on staff so as to avoid TUPE. This is the problem with Suzen that the more recent Court of Appeal and EAT decisions (such as OCS Cleaning and ECM v Cox) have sought to move away from - however, it is now back in the spotlight.

On the facts, the ECJ held that (despite the majority of the workforce moving over), the lack of the transfer of the main assets (ie the buses) "must lead to the conclusion that the entity does not retain its identity" - ie no transfer!

The English text of the judgment is at: http://www.europa.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit=Submit&docrequire=alldocs&numaff=&datefs=2001-01-25&datefe=&nomusuel=&domaine=&mots=&resmax=100

Tuesday, 23 January 2001

Cerebus Software v Rowley (+ other matters)

CONTENTS
1. Court of Appeal decision - Cerebus Software v Rowley
2. Extensions to Working Time Directive
3. Jobs - Solicitor seeking new position

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1. Court of Appeal Decision - Cerebus Software v Rowley

"This is an interesting appeal on a troublesome little point of employment law."

So starts Ward LJ's judgment in this controversial case, handed down on 18th January 2001.

Facts: Mr Rowley was entitled to six-months' notice of termination of employment. His contract provided that the employers could pay a lump sum in lieu of notice. He was dismissed summarily on various charges, which the employment tribunal found to be fabricated. The employment tribunal awarded him the full six months' pay, despite him having earned monies during that period in a new job, on the basis that the six months' pay was a contractual payment and not damages for breach of contract. Thus it was a straightforward claim for a debt, not an action for damages, and no duty to mitigate (or to give credit for other earnings) arose. The EAT upheld the employment tribunal's reasoning.

Issue: Where an employer dismisses and employee of grounds of misconduct, later held to be unfounded, is the employee's claim one for damages for wrongful dismissal (subject to the employee's duty to mitigate his loss) or is the employee entitled to assert a contractual right to payment in lieu of notice without credit having to be given for earnings received in new employment obtained within the period of notice? (this is the wording set out in para. 1 of Ward LJ's judgment)

Held (Ward & Parker LJJ, in the majority): The wording of the contract, namely "it is agreed that the employer may make a payment in lieu of notice to the employee" meant that the employer had a right to elect whether to pay the lump sum or not. It did not give rise to the employee being able to insist on 6-months' salary in lieu of notice. The employee's action was for damages for breach of contract and, with it being a straightforward wrongful dismissal claim, he was obliged to give credit for the earnings received during the 6-month notice period.

Held (Sedley LJ, in the minority): In a powerful and scathing judgment, Sedley LJ attacks the contractual orthodoxy as being unfair and immoral. He considers that a company which is guilty of wrongful dismissal should not be permitted to avoid its contractual and moral obligation to pay 6 months' salary by taking advantage of the employee getting another job. Yet his reasoning depends on a somewhat complicated theoretical analysis, without reliance on any authorities in support, and whilst he comes to an undoubtedly 'just' result, it is difficult to reconcile his reasoning with a more traditional approach to contractual interpretation.

The full decision can be found at the court service website on http://www.courtservice.gov.uk/judgments/judg_home.htm



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2. Extensions to Working Time Directive

Readers will be aware that the Working Time Directive (and the UK Working Time Regulations 1998) exclude certain sectors such as road, rail, air and sea workers from the legislation.

These sectors are now, under new EC Directives, to be covered.

The main Directive is the Horizontal Amending Directive (in fact, there are 5 Directives in total!). The majority of these new rights must be implemented by 1st August 2003.

Of particular political importance is the introduction of a maximum working week for junior doctors.

(a) Road Workers
The Horizontal Amending Directive allows non-mobile road workers to benefit from the Working Time Regulations ('WTR') in full. Mobile workers (ie drivers) become entitled to paid annual leave, a 48-hour working week and health checks for night workers, but NOT to minimum breaks and rest periods. These are to be the subject of the separate Road Transport Directive (the one which has not yet been adopted).

(b) Rail Workers
The Horizontal Amending Directive extends the WTR to mobile and non-mobile rail workers in full, with derogations from the entitlements to daily rest, rest breaks, weekly rest and the night work provisions for specific workers.

(c) Air Workers
The Horizontal Amending Directive provides that non-mobile workers receive benefit of WTR in full. Mobile workers (pilots, stewards etc.) receive paid annual leave, 48-hour week, health checks for night workers and adequate rests.

(d) Sea Workers
The Horizontal Amending Directive extends the WTR in full to non-mobile sea workers. For mobile workers (fishermen), the Directive provides for maximum daily and weekly hours, with the weekly hours not exceeding 48-hours per week over a 12 month average and limited to 72 hours in any 7-day period. There are also minimum rest hours, entitlement to paid holiday, and health checks for night workers. Member states can exceed these limits only after consultation with industry representatives.

(e) Junior Doctors
All of the WTR provisions shall apply, to be implemented by 1st August 2004, with the exception of the 48-hour week which is to be phased over a possible total 12 years. An initial 4-year implementation period will be followed by a transitional period of 5 years (with weekly working limits of 58 hours for 3 years, and 56 hours for the next 2 years). States with particular operationsal difficulties can seek an additional 3-year period, taking the final implementation date to 1st August 2012.
For further details, visit www.dti.gov.uk/er/work_time_regs/exsectors.htm

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3. Jobs - Solicitor seeking new position

A solicitor who instructs me regularly is looking for a new position. I have worked with her for over 4 years, and have no hesitation in recommending her as an experienced, dedicated, highly able and very personable practitioner.

Her summary CV follows:

Second career Employment lawyer looking for move to larger more commercially-oriented firm. First career as a TV researcher. Five years qualified, salaried partner. 50% of my work is Employment, both contentious and non-contentious, employer and employee. Caseload includes DDA claim in ECHR (early stages). The other 50% is commercial litigation and Personal Injury work.

Member of ELA and contributor to SW working party on CRE's proposed changes to Race Relations Act. Fully IT literate (including responsibility for current firm's website). Particularly interested in PSL/TKL position as I like the prospect of varied project-based work with input into management. Based in the SW - Bristol, Birmingham, Cheltenham, Gloucester and Oxford all commutable.

If you are interested, please contact her directly on anne@bewicke.freeserve.co.uk

Thursday, 18 January 2001

New Draft Legislation + other matters

CONTENTS
1. New draft legislation
2. Lord Irvine's appeal
3. New EAT decision


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1. New draft legislation

I am told two Bills received first readings in the House of Commons yesterday (I have not yet seen the text of the Bills). The first, the Employee Consultation Rights Bill, apparently requires employers with more than 50 employees to consult workforce representatives on large business issues which directly affect employees. The second, the Outworking Bill, seeks to restrict fraudulent outworking schemes by prohibiting demands for advance payments from outworkers in order for them to obtain work.

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2. Lord Irvine's Appeal

According to newspaper reports, the EAT yesterday allowed the Lord Chancellor's appeal (by a 2:1 majority) in Coker v Lord Chancellor - thus he did not indirectly discriminate against Jane Coker when appointing Gary Hart as his special advisor.

I have not seen the transcript yet, but will summarise the reasons once it is available.


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3. New EAT Decision

This case has been placed on the EAT website (http://wood.ccta.gov.uk/eat/eatjudgments.nsf) in the last 24 hours. It is unreported, although it may be reported in due course.

Jones v ICS Cleaning Services Ltd. [11.4.2000, Lindsay P.]
An old case (pre- MacDonald v Ministry of Defence) in which the EAT held that the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 requires a homosexual man to be compared with a homosexual woman when deciding whether less favourable treatment has occurred. The case sets out some of the "very crude and very coarse" practices that went on "in the male restroom" at Stanstead airport during the 1990s. Anyone reading this decision is unlikely to want to fly from Stanstead again!

Wednesday, 17 January 2001

Increase in Tribunal Awards

CONTENTS
1. Increase in Tribunal Awards
2. Addition to previous bulletin - O'Neill v HSBC Bank

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1. Increase in Tribunal Awards

It's that time of the year again. The Employment Rights (Increase of Limits) Order 2001 (SI 2001/21) has just been publised, setting out the annual increase in the limits for tribunal awards (which are now linked to increases in the Retail Price Index under the Employment Relations Act 1999).

The most important increases are:
'A week's pay' for a basic award or redundancy payment - £240pw (was £230pw)

Maximum compensatory award for unfair dismissal - £51,700 (was £50,000)
The new limits come into force on 1st February 2001. For unfair dismissal cases, the effective date of termination (rather than the date of the hearing) must be on or after 1st February 2001. The Regulations set out the transitional provisions for other types of claim.

I attach a copy of the Order to this Email (HTML format, reproduced with permission of Her Majesty's Stationery Office), which contains the full list of increases.
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2. Addition to Previous Bulletin

The bulletin on 9th January 2001 contained a summary of O'Neill v HSBC Bank (on justification under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 regarding performance related bonus schemes).

I have received the following message from Sue Ashtiany of Morgan Cole. She says (reproduced with her permission):

"I notice that you have noted O'Neill in which I appeared for the bank. There is an important point of correction which you should also note.

"The respondent bank admitted that O'Neill was disabled (for the purpose of this case) and that the scheme discriminated against him within the meaning of section 5(1), but NOT that it discriminated against disabled people generally within the meaning of section 5(2) so as to give rise to a duty to make reasonable adjustments under section 6(1). This was an important plank of the alternative argument, which the tribunal accepted. So the case is maybe even a little more interesting than at first sight."

Thursday, 11 January 2001

Important TUPE case - Cheesman v Brewer Contracts

Cheesman v Brewer Contracts [30.11.00, Lindsay P.]
An extremely authoritative decision on the EAT, tying together the strings of the myriad of recent TUPE cases post-Suzen, was posted on the EAT website yesterday afternoon.

This decision is a must read for readers involved with TUPE cases (the web address is at the bottom of the bulletin).

In the decision, the EAT states that it will usually be an error of law NOT to consider, separately, the two questions:

(1) what is the entity that constitutes an undertaking? and,
(2) has it transferred?

In respect of each of the two questions, Lindsay P. brought together all relevant authorities to create a list of criteria. These are:

Question 1: Is there an undertaking?

I copy an extract from paragraph 10 of the decision:
"10. (i) As to whether there is an undertaking, there needs to be found a stable economic entity whose activity is not limited to performing one specific works contract, an organised grouping of persons and of assets enabling (or facilitating) the exercise of an economic activity which pursues a specific objective - Sanchez Hidalgo paragraph 25; Allen paragraph 24 and Vidal para 6 (which, confusingly, places the reference to "an economic activity" a little differently). It has been held that the reference to "one specific works contract" is to be restricted to a contract for building works - see Argyll Training infra EAT at paras 14-19.

"(ii) In order to be such an undertaking it must be sufficiently structured and autonomous but will not necessarily have significant assets, tangible or intangible - Vidal paragraph 27; Sanchez Hidalgo paragraph 26.

"(iii) In certain sectors such as cleaning and surveillance the assets are often reduced to their most basic and the activity is essentially based on manpower - Sanchez Hidalgo paragraph 26.

"(iv) An organised grouping of wage-earners who are specifically and permanently assigned to a common task may in the absence of other factors of production, amount to an economic entity - Vidal paragraph 27; Sanchez Hidalgo paragraph 26.

"(v) An activity of itself is not an entity; the identity of an entity emerges from other factors such as its workforce, management staff, the way in which its work is organised, its operating methods and, where appropriate, the operational resources available to it - Vidal paragraph 30; Sanchez Hidalgo paragraph 30; Allen paragraph 27."

Question 2: Has the undertaking transferred?

Paragraph 11 of the decision:

"(i) As to whether there is any relevant sense a transfer, the decisive criterion for establishing the existence of a transfer is whether the entity in question retains its identity, as indicated, inter alia, by the fact that its operation is actually continued or resumed - Vidal paragraph 22 and the case there cited; Spijkers -v- Gebrobroeders Benedik Abattoir C.V. [1986] ECR 1119 ECJ; Schmidt -v- Spar-und Leihkasse [1994] IRLR 302 ECJ para 17; Sanchez Hidalgo paragraph 21; Allen paragraph 23.

"(ii) In a labour intensive sector it is to be recognised that an entity is capable of maintaining its identity after it has been transferred where the new employer does not merely pursue the activity in question but also takes over a major part, in terms of their numbers and skills, of the employees specially assigned by his predecessors to that task. That follows from the fact that in certain labour intensive sectors a group of workers engaged in the joint activity on a permanent basis may constitute an economic entity - Sanchez Hidalgo paragraph 32.

"(iii) In considering whether the conditions for existence of a transfer are met it is necessary to consider all the factors characterising the transaction in question but each is a single factor and none is to be considered in isolation - Vidal paragraph 29; Sanchez Hidalgo paragraph 29; Allen paragraph 26. However, whilst no authority so holds, it may, presumably, not be an error of law to consider "the decisive criterion" in (i) above in isolation; that, surely, is an aspect of its being "decisive", although, as one sees from the "inter alia" in (i) above, "the decisive criterion" is not itself said to depend on a single factor.

"(iv) Amongst the matters thus falling for consideration are the type of undertaking, whether or not its tangible assets are transferred, the value of its intangible assets at the time of transfer, whether or not the majority of its employees are taken over by the new company, whether or not its customers are transferred, the degree of similarity between the activities carried on before and after the transfer, and the period, if any, in which they are suspended - Sanchez Hidalgo paragraph 29; Allen paragraph 26.

"(v) In determining whether or not there has been a transfer, account has to be taken, inter alia, of the type of undertaking or business in issue, and the degree of importance to be attached to the several criteria will necessarily vary according to the activity carried on - Vidal paragraph 31; Sanchez Hidalgo paragraph 31; Allen paragraph 28.

"(vi) Where an economic entity is able to function without any significant tangible or intangible assets, the maintenance of its identity following the transaction being examined cannot logically depend on the transfer of such assets - Vidal paragraph 31; Sanchez Hidalgo paragraph 31; Allen paragraph 28.

"(vii) Even where assets are owned and are required to run the undertaking, the fact that they do not pass does not preclude a transfer - Allen paragraph 30.

"(viii) Where maintenance work is carried out by a cleaning firm and then next by the owner of the premises concerned, that mere fact does not justify the conclusion that there has been a transfer - Vidal paragraph 35.

"(ix) More broadly, the mere fact that the service provided by the old and new undertaking providing a contracted-out service or the old and new contract-holder are similar does not justify the conclusion that there has been a transfer of an economic entity between predecessor and successor - Sanchez Hidalgo paragraph 30.

"(x) The absence of any contractual link between transferor and transferee may be evidence that there has been no relevant transfer but it is certainly not conclusive as there is no need for any such direct contractual relationship Sanchez Hidalgo paragraphs 22 and 23.

"(xi) When no employees are transferred, the reasons why that is the case can be relevant as to whether or not there was a transfer - ECM page 1169 e-f.

"(xii) The fact that the work is performed continuously with no interruption or change in the manner or performance is a normal feature of transfers of undertakings but there is no particular importance to be attached to a gap between the end of the work by one sub-contractor and the start by the successor - Allen paragraphs 32-33."

The full transcript can be downloaded from http://wood.ccta.gov.uk/eat/eatjudgments.nsf/faf4a44f36aa53fc80256794004040c2/5ce87a5cbb11f246802569d0002e4149?OpenDocument

Tuesday, 9 January 2001

Various cases

CONTENTS
1. Central Arbitration Committee - Red Letter Bradford Ltd v GPMU
2. Recent EAT Decisions
3. Employment Tribunal decision on disability discrimination justification - O'Neill v HSBC Bank

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1. Red Letter Bradford Ltd v GPMU
Central Arbitration Committee, December 2000 (Professor Roy Lewis, chair)

An example of the CAC deciding what amounts to a 'bargaining unit'. Red Letter Bradford was a mail order business employing 67 people. Of these, 58 were shopfloor workers/IT workers, and the remaining 9 were managers and non-shopfloor workers.

The GPMU, which is a media trade union, submitted an application that it should be recognised for the purpose of collective bargaining, with the 58 shopfloor workers/IT workers as the bargaining unit. It did not want to include the remaining 9 in the bargaining unit, because it said the terms and conditions were significantly different.

The employer submitted all 67 employees should be in the bargaining unit, since to include just 58 would result in a fragmented workforce with a small 'rump' of workers without representation, thereby hindering company management.

The CAC found as facts that there were a number of differences between the groups, including the former being paid overtime (with management and non-shopfloor workers not receiving overtime), the former being paid on a hourly rate (the others on a salary), the former having to clock on and off, and wage being linked to a grading system based on skills and experience (unlike the managers and non-shopfloor workers).

Accordingly the CAC held that the shopfloor workers/IT workers were a discrete group and capable of forming an independent bargaining unit. Although the CAC recognised that this made management slightly more difficult, it noted that Red Letter's associated companies adopted a similar system of recognition for shopfloor workers only, and held that a balancing exercise favoured the union's position.





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2. Recent EAT Decisions

These cases are unreported (although some may be reported in due course). All transcripts can be found at http://wood.ccta.gov.uk/eat/eatjudgments.nsf.

Lilburne-Byford v Essex County Council [13.11.2000, HHJ Wilson]
A (welcome!) example of the EAT upholding the tribunal's decision to award costs. Authority for the proposition that there is no obligation on a tribunal to investigate the Applicant's means prior to making a costs order.


ValueUnion Limited v White [7.11.2000, HHJ Wilkie QC]
Confirming that, in redundancy cases where it is genuinely unclear whether a fair procedure would have made a difference, the tribunal is entitled to refuse to make any Polkey reduction.

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3. O'Neill v HSBC Bank


HSBC bank introduced a pay scheme which awarded an annual bonus to employees based upon three factors: achievement of a job target, personal performance factor and corporate performance factor. This yielded a multiplier which was applied to the annual salary to calculate the bonus.

However, a matrix system was also introduced to discount the bonus depending on the number of days absence for an employee. Employees who were absent for less than 20 days were not penalised. However, employees who were absent for more than 20 days suffered staggered discounts to their bonus. This scheme, which was introduced after extensive consultation with the recognised union, was designed to combat sick absence (which was a significant problem for the bank).

Mr O'Neill complained that this discriminated against disabled persons, since they were more likely to be absent from work. That was accepted by the bank, and the only issue was justification.

The tribunal held, in a thorough and well-reasoned decision, that the bonus scheme was a performance-related pay scheme - and it was not prevented from being so by the use of absence from work as a factor. It therefore fell within regulation 3 of the Disability Discrimination (Employment) Regulations 1996, which indicated that such a scheme was justified, and within paragraph 5.29 of the Code of Practice (also indicating that such a scheme was justified).