Wednesday, 25 April 2012

Age Discrimination

[Thanks to Dr John McMullen of Wrigleys Solicitors LLP for preparing this case summary]

The Supreme Court has handed down its decision in Homer v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police on the scope of indirect discrimination on the ground of age.

At the age of 51 Homer began working for the Police National Legal Database. He had no degree in law, but, when he was appointed, a law degree was not a requirement of the job, provided the postholder had other qualifications and exceptional skills or experience in criminal law. Homer had those experience and skills. A new grading structure was then introduced. There were three promotion thresholds, the third and final one requiring a law degree. Because of this requirement Homer could not get to level three unless he embarked on a part time law degree alongside his day job, which would have taken 4 years. When the new requirement came in Homer was 62, and being required to retire at 65 (this was before the abolition of the default retirement age), he would not have been able to enjoy the level three promotion before he had to leave PNLD.

He brought a claim of age discrimination under the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 (see now Equality Act 2010). His claim was for indirect discrimination in that he had been subject to a provision, criterion or practice which put persons of his age group (including him) at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons.

The EAT and Court of Appeal had rejected Homer's claim. Their view was that what put Homer at a disadvantageous position was not his age, but his impending retirement. His position was therefore comparable with any other employees nearing the end of their employment, for whatever reason.

The Supreme Court (Lords Hope, Brown, Mance, Kerr and Lady Hale) disagreed with this analysis and upheld Homer's appeal. Persons in the position of Homer were disadvantaged because of a reason (retirement) that directly related to their age. It could not be correct to equate leaving because of impending retirement with other reasons for doing so. Lady Hale also points out that the form of words used in the Age Regulations (see now the EA 2010) were intended to make it easier, rather than more difficult, to establish indirect discrimination.

Although Homer was indirectly discriminated against on ground of age it was still open for the employer to justify the discriminatory requirement. That issue was remitted to the employment tribunal for consideration in the light of the Supreme Court's findings. 

Mandatory Retirement Age

[Thanks to Claire McCann of Cloisters Chambers for preparing this case summary]

The Supreme Court has held in Seldon v Clarkson Wright and Jakes (a Partnership) that the test for justifying direct age discrimination is different and narrower than the general test for justifying indirect discrimination.

The case concerned a partner from the Respondent firm of solicitors who was forced to retire when he turned 65. The Supreme Court held that the compulsory retirement age contained in the firm's deed of partnership was a directly discriminatory measure but that it was capable of justification as it was founded on legitimate social policy aims - summed up as 'inter-generational fairness' and 'dignity'. However, the case was remitted back to the employment tribunal for consideration of whether the selection of the specific age of 65 was a proportionate means of achieving those aims in the circumstances of the particular business.

The test for justifying direct age discrimination, as now clarified, is that employers must show:

  • They have an aim;
  • That aim is potentially legitimate in that it is capable of being a 'public interest' aim as specified in the Framework Directive (2000/78/EC) [59]. Those 'public interest' aims are distinguishable from purely individual aims particular to the business, such as cost reduction or improving competitiveness;
  • The aim is also legitimate in the particular circumstances of the case [58] & [61]. A potentially legitimate aim within the Directive may not be so for the particular business concerned. This is explained by the examples given in [61]: so, avoiding the need for performance management is an aim directly connected with the 'public interest' aim relating to 'dignity' but if, in fact, the business already has sophisticated performance management procedures in place, it may not be legitimate to disapply them for one section of the workforce. This requires particular scrutiny of the aim in the context of the individual business to see if it is legitimate for that employment;
The means chosen to achieve the aim must be both appropriate and necessary. In Homer v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police, the SC emphasises that proportionality must be approached by considering both these aspects separately. This will involve considering whether there are other, less discriminatory, measures which would achieve the aim. This test represents a narrowing of the circumstances in which an employer can justify direct discrimination.

Supreme Court Judgments on Age Discrimination


The Supreme Court has handed down its judgments in Seldon and Homer, both dealing with different aspects of age discrimination.

A fuller summary will follow, but for now, here are the links to the press summary and the full judgments.

Daniel Barnett 

Tuesday, 24 April 2012

Addendum - EAT Practice Statement - 17th April 2012


The editor of the IRLRs, Michael Rubenstein, has asked me to forward on this comment, which I am happy to do:-

"The EAT's new Practice Statement does not draw a distinction between "official" law reports and others. The distinction drawn by Mr Justice Langstaff is between "formal" reports with head notes, such as the ICRs or IRLRs, and electronic reports of cases, such as from BAILLI."

Original bulletin appears below

The President of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, Mr Justice Langstaff, has issued a Practice Statement dated 17th April 2012.

All practitioners who appear in the EAT should read the full document; the summary below is not a suitable substitute. The main points are:-
  • in cases where fresh evidence arises, the preferred course is to seek a review from the Employment Tribunal before appealing to the EAT;
  • appeals should not normally involve citing more than 10 authorities. Practitioners should use the official law report copies where possible, and highlight the relevant extracts in the authorities bundle.
Any practitioners who do not comply with the Practice Statement may be asked to justify their departure from it. 

EAT Practice Statement - 17th April 2012


The President of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, Mr Justice Langstaff, has issued a Practice Statement dated 17th April 2012.

All practitioners who appear in the EAT should read the full document; the summary below is not a suitable substitute. The main points are:-
  • in cases where fresh evidence arises, the preferred course is to seek a review from the Employment Tribunal before appealing to the EAT;
  • appeals should not normally involve citing more than 10 authorities. Practitioners should use the official law report copies where possible, and highlight the relevant extracts in the authorities bundle.
Any practitioners who do not comply with the Practice Statement may be asked to justify their departure from it. 

Monday, 23 April 2012

Discrimination: Unsuccessful Job Applicants

[Thanks to Dr John McMullen of Wrigleys Solicitors LLP for preparing this case summary]

Can a worker, who claims plausibly that she met the requirements listed in a job advertisement, and who did not get the job, get disclosure of information indicating whether the employer engaged another applicant at the end of the recruitment process?

No, says the CJEU in
Meister v Speech Design Carrier Systems GmbH.

Ms Meister, a Russian national, applied for the post of 'experienced software developer' with Speech Design. Her application was rejected without an interview. It was not disputed that her level of experience corresponded with the requirements of the post.


She brought discrimination claims on ground of her sex, age and ethnic origin. She also claimed that production of the successful candidate's file would show that she (Meister) was more qualified than that person.


However the CJEU held that Article 8(1) of the EU Race Equality Directive (No.2000/43), Article 10(1) of the EU Equal Treatment Framework Directive (No.2000/78) and Article 19(1) of the EU Equal Treatment Directive (No.2006/54) were not to be interpreted as entitling a person in Ms Meister's position to have access to the successful candidate's file.


On the other hand, it must be ensured that a refusal of disclosure by the employer did not compromise the objective of these Directives. Therefore it could not be ruled out that an employer's refusal to grant access to the information may be one of the factors to take into account in the context of establishing facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or in direct discrimination. Consideration of those factors (which, the Court added, might also include, in the present case, the fact that Meister was at least equally qualified and was not even called for interview) was a matter for the National Court.


Costs

[Thanks to David Campion, Pupil Barrister at Garden Court North Chambers, for preparing this case summary]

Before making a costs order, should an Employment Tribunal raise the issue of the potential paying party's ability to pay costs, even if the issue is not raised by or on behalf of that party?

Yes, in some circumstances, says the EAT in Doyle v North West London Hospitals NHS Trust.

Under Rule 41(2) of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure, when considering whether to award costs or the amount of such costs, an employment tribunal 'may have regard to the paying party's ability to pay'.

Following dismissing the Claimant's claims, the employment tribunal made an order that the Claimant should pay the entirety of the Respondent's costs, which were very substantial and then estimated at around £60,000. The Tribunal had not considered the Claimant's ability to pay when reaching this decision, nor had the issue been raised by the Claimant's legal representative.

The EAT concluded that the tribunal had not erred in deciding to award costs. However, in the particular circumstances of the case, which included a potentially very large costs award and nothing to indicate that the Claimant could pay such an award, the EAT concluded that the tribunal had erred in law by not raising the issue of ability to pay before deciding on the costs application.

The EAT commented that tribunals should always be cautious before making a very large costs award, given the very serious potential consequences to a Claimant of such an order and because such orders may act as a disincentive to those bringing legitimate claims.

The EAT referred the case back to the same employment tribunal to make reasonable enquiries into the Claimant's means, to decide whether to take into account the Claimant's ability to pay, and if so, to consider the appropriate costs order having regard to the Claimant's ability to pay.

Tuesday, 17 April 2012

Costs Warnings

[Thanks to Jahad Rahman of Kervin & Barnes Solicitors for preparing this case summary]

Does the failure to give a costs warning make it harder to seek an order for costs?


Yes, says the EAT (Recorder Luba QC) in
Rogers v Dorothy Barley School UKEAT/0013/12/LA.

Mr Rogers was a caretaker at Dorothy Barley School (DBS) and as a benefit of his employment he was entitled to live in the caretaker's house. There was a change in the water billing arrangements, and due to an administrative error, he was presented with a bill for the supply of water to the house.


The thrust of his complaint in the ET was that DBS was acting in breach of his contract by causing water bills to be presented to him for payment and/or alternatively instructing him to pay them.


The EAT upheld the ET decision and held that the ET had no jurisdiction to hear the claim because he was still employed by DBS. The EAT also held that the appeal was misconceived but refused an application for costs against Mr Rogers because: (i) no letter had been sent to him warning him that if he proceeds with his claim, an application for costs will be made; (ii) no schedule of costs had been supplied in advance of the hearing and therefore, Mr Rogers 'had no opportunity to assess or contest the amount that is proposed'.


Monday, 16 April 2012

Employment Transfers

[Thanks to Dr John McMullen of Wrigleys Solicitors LLP for preparing this case summary]

In the absence of a relevant TUPE transfer, can an individual's employment transfer from one employer to another without the employee's consent?

No, says the EAT in
Gabriel v Peninsula Business Services.

The Claimant was employed by Peninsula as a marketing consultant. Peninsula purchased the shares of a company later known as Taxwise Services Ltd. The Claimant was moved to Peninsula's 'Taxwise Department' and on to the Taxwise payroll, but ostensibly remained employed by Peninsula.


An email was then sent, stating that the trade and assets of Peninsula's Taxwise business were to be transferred to Taxwise Services Ltd, along with the employee's employment contract. The Claimant did not receive the email and was otherwise unaware of the purported change of employer. The Claimant then brought sex and race discrimination claims against both companies. For the purposes of compliance with the now repealed statutory grievance procedure and limitation issues (the details of which need not concern us here) the identity of the true employer was important. In essence, for her claim to succeed against Peninsula, as well as Taxwise, she had to show she remained employed by Peninsula over the relevant period.


The EAT (overruling the employment tribunal) applied the House of Lords authority of Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014 to the effect that, at common law, the employment of an employee cannot be transferred from one employer to another without the consent of the employee. Peninsula therefore remained her 'general employer', and the claim against Peninsula could therefore proceed.


It is important to note that TUPE was not pleaded by the employer. If TUPE had applied, the statutory doctrine of automatic transfer of employment would of course have been engaged, subject only to the employee's right to object to the same under Reg 4 (7) of TUPE.