Friday, 8 June 2012

Unfair Selection For Redundancy

[Thanks to Ed McFarlane of Deminos HR for preparing this case summary]

Are subjective redundancy selection criteria bad? No, says the EAT (the Master of the Rolls presiding) in Mitchells of Lancaster (Brewers) Ltd v Tattersall, noting that criteria that involve a degree of judgment are none the worse for that.

The Claimant was one of five members of the Respondent's senior management team, unfairly dismissed after a flawed redundancy selection process, but with a 20% Polkey deduction. The Respondent appealed on a number of grounds, and whilst the EAT upheld the finding of Unfair Dismissal, it disagreed with the Employment Tribunal's criticism of the Respondent's subjective selection criteria, based on assessing which role in that team could be lost with the least effect on its business. In paragraph 21 the EAT noted that '...just because (subjective) criteria...' '...are matters of judgment, it does not mean that they cannot be assessed in a dispassionate or objective way...', further noting that '...the concept of a criterion only being valid if it can be "scored or assessed" causes us a little concern, as it could be invoked to limit selection procedures to box-ticking exercises...'.

The EAT observed that for a relatively small company in serious financial difficulty, it was hard to see how it was inappropriate for the Respondent to apply the criteria used, holding that those criteria were 'unexceptionable'.

The EAT therefore overturned the ET's 20% Polkey deduction as '...significantly too small...' in the light of its view of the significantly greater likelihood of the Claimant's selection for redundancy on the criteria used, remitting the amount of the increase of the Polkey deduction to the same Tribunal, indicating that no fresh evidence should be permitted.

Wednesday, 6 June 2012

TUPE - Assignment of a Pub Lease

[Thanks to Dr John McMullen of Wrigleys Solicitors LLP for preparing this case summary]

Can the assignment of a lease of commercial premises amount to a TUPE transfer?

Not unless it can be shown that there was concomitantly a transfer of an economic entity retaining its identity, says the EAT in LOM Management v Sweeney.

A tenant ran MacConnell's Bar in Glasgow under a commercial lease from a brewery. The lease was then assigned to a new tenant. The claimant was on holiday at the time of the assignment. On her return she discovered from the new tenant that she no longer had a job at the pub. The question was whether there had been a TUPE transfer automatically transferring her employment from the outgoing tenant to the incoming tenant. An employment tribunal found there was a TUPE transfer. In its opinion 'this was a classic transfer of undertakings situation'. It therefore found that the claimant had been automatically unfairly dismissed by the new tenant.

The EAT reversed this decision. Whist it is trite law that TUPE can apply where there has been an assignment of a lease of commercial property (see, for example Landsorganisationen i Danmark v Ny Molle Kro [1989] ICR 330), it must also be shown that there was a transfer of a business which was intrinsically liked to the property and satisfied the definition of an economic entity. In other words, it had to be shown there was an organised grouping of persons and assets facilitating the exercise of an economic activity which pursues a specific objective. In short, the assignment of a commercial lease does not of itself establish that TUPE applies.

The employment tribunal had failed to ask the relevant questions about whether there had been an economic entity retaining its identity and whether, if so, it had transferred to the new tenant, and its decision could not stand.

Friday, 1 June 2012

Effective Date of Termination

[Thanks to Angharad Davies of Dere Street Barristers for preparing this case summary]

Is a tribunal entitled to take into account an otherwise unsuccessful internal appeal that purports to change the effective date of termination (EDT)?

Yes,says the EAT in Hawes & Curtis v Arfan & Mirza.

This was a decision arising out of the Claimants being summarily dismissed on 5 October 2010. They appealed under the internal disciplinary procedure. The dismissal was upheld but they were told, by letter, that their EDT would be the date of the appeal decision (4 November 2010). They were paid until this date. The tribunal held that the EDT was 4 November.

Claim forms were lodged citing the EDT as 4 November, this was challenged by the Respondent. By a majority decision the tribunal held that the EDT was 4 November. The Respondent appealed, arguing that the EDT for the purposes of s 97(1) ERA 1996 is to be determined objectively and crystallised at the date when the summary dismissal is communicated. It cannot be varied by appeal. The Claimant placed reliance on the decision of Gisda Cyf v Barratt [2010] ICR 1475 in arguing the variation of the employer's decision at appeal was determinative.

The EAT dismissed the appeal: the tribunal found that this was a relatively rare case where the Respondent intended to change, and did change, the EDT. Nonetheless, the starting point in a dismissal without notice is the 'date on which the termination took effect'. The provision of an internal appeal is integral to the protection of employment rights which underlies the purpose of s 97(1) and can be considered if relevant to proceedings.

Can Employers Re-discipline for the Same Offence?

Can an employer put an employee through a second disciplinary procedure, for the same offence, on the grounds that the original disciplinary procedure didn't impose a serious enough sanction?

Yes, in exceptional circumstances, says the Employment Appeal Tribunal in Christou & Ward v Haringey, a case stemming from the death of Baby P in 2007.

Ms Ward was the social worker responsible for Baby P. Ms Christou was her supervisor, whom Sharon Shoesmith promised would not lose her job over the death of Baby P. Both employees were put through Haringey's 'Simplified Disciplinary Procedure'. The maximum penalty under the Simplified Disciplinary Procedure was a written warning, which they both duly received.

Subsequently, after the media storm, the OFSTED inspection and the sacking of Sharon Shoesmith, the new regime at Haringey commenced a second set of disciplinary proceedings against them arising out of the same facts. They were dismissed. They argued that it was legally impermissible, or simply unfair, to dismiss based upon a disciplinary offence for which they had already been sanctioned.

The EAT (Slade J presiding) upheld the majority decision of the employment tribunal that the dismissals were not unfair. It held there was no concept of 'double jeopardy' or 'res judicata' in internal disciplinary proceedings. It held that whilst it would be unusual for a second set of disciplinary proceedings to follow a first set arising out of the same facts, this was a 'rare' case and the tribunal was entitled to hold that the employer's actions were fair in the light of the media spotlight and the new management regime which took a different view of the seriousness of the employees' conduct (see para 112).

Friday, 25 May 2012

PILONs, Notice Pay and After-Discovered Conduct

[Thanks to Catriona Stirling of Cloisters for preparing this case summary]

Is an employer entitled to withhold a payment in lieu of notice if it dismisses an employee under an express term in his service agreement which provides for summary termination with pay in lieu, but later discovers that the employee had committed gross misconduct prior to the dismissal?

No, says the Court of Appeal in Cavanagh v William Evans Ltd.

The company decided that Mr Cavenagh was redundant and summarily terminated his service agreement, which provided for six months of pay in lieu of notice. It subsequently discovered that Mr Cavenagh was guilty of gross misconduct pre-termination and did not make the payment. Had it known about the gross misconduct when it exercised its contractual power, it would have accepted the repudiatory breach of the service agreement and regarded itself as discharged from liability for pay in lieu of notice.

The Court of Appeal held that Mr Cavanagh had acquired an accrued right to the payment, as his contract had been summarily terminated under the relevant contractual provision. There was no provision in the service agreement denying him the right to the payment in lieu if the company subsequently discovered that he had committed a prior act of gross misconduct. Nor was there any general principle of contract law barring or extinguishing his right to recover the pay in lieu as a debt from the company. The principle that a claim for wrongful dismissal could be defeated by relying on evidence of misconduct discovered after the dismissal did not provide the company with a defence to a debt claim.