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[Thanks
to Ed McFarlane of Deminos
HR for preparing this case summary]
Are subjective redundancy selection
criteria bad? No, says the EAT (the Master of the Rolls presiding) in Mitchells of Lancaster (Brewers) Ltd v Tattersall, noting
that criteria that involve a degree of judgment are none the worse for that.
The Claimant was one of five members of the Respondent's senior management
team, unfairly dismissed after a flawed redundancy selection process, but with
a 20% Polkey deduction. The Respondent appealed on a number of grounds, and
whilst the EAT upheld the finding of Unfair Dismissal, it disagreed with the
Employment Tribunal's criticism of the Respondent's subjective selection
criteria, based on assessing which role in that team could be lost with the
least effect on its business. In paragraph 21 the EAT noted that '...just because (subjective)
criteria...' '...are
matters of judgment, it does not mean that they cannot be assessed in a
dispassionate or objective way...', further noting that '...the concept of a criterion only
being valid if it can be "scored or assessed" causes us a little
concern, as it could be invoked to limit selection procedures to box-ticking
exercises...'.
The EAT observed that for a relatively small company in serious financial
difficulty, it was hard to see how it was inappropriate for the Respondent to
apply the criteria used, holding that those criteria were 'unexceptionable'.
The EAT therefore overturned the ET's 20% Polkey deduction as '...significantly too small...' in
the light of its view of the significantly greater likelihood of the Claimant's
selection for redundancy on the criteria used, remitting the amount of the
increase of the Polkey deduction to the same Tribunal, indicating that no fresh
evidence should be permitted.
[Thanks
to Dr John McMullen of Wrigleys Solicitors LLP for preparing
this case summary]
Can the assignment of a lease of
commercial premises amount to a TUPE transfer?
Not unless it can be shown that there was concomitantly a transfer of an
economic entity retaining its identity, says the EAT in LOM Management v Sweeney.
A tenant ran MacConnell's Bar in Glasgow under a commercial lease from a
brewery. The lease was then assigned to a new tenant. The claimant was on
holiday at the time of the assignment. On her return she discovered from the
new tenant that she no longer had a job at the pub. The question was whether
there had been a TUPE transfer automatically transferring her employment from
the outgoing tenant to the incoming tenant. An employment tribunal found there
was a TUPE transfer. In its opinion 'this was a classic transfer of undertakings
situation'. It therefore found that the claimant had been automatically
unfairly dismissed by the new tenant.
The EAT reversed this decision. Whist it is trite law that TUPE can apply where
there has been an assignment of a lease of commercial property (see, for
example Landsorganisationen i Danmark v Ny Molle Kro [1989] ICR 330), it must
also be shown that there was a transfer of a business which was intrinsically
liked to the property and satisfied the definition of an economic entity. In
other words, it had to be shown there was an organised grouping of persons and
assets facilitating the exercise of an economic activity which pursues a
specific objective. In short, the assignment of a commercial lease does not of
itself establish that TUPE applies.
The employment tribunal had failed to ask the relevant questions about whether
there had been an economic entity retaining its identity and whether, if so, it
had transferred to the new tenant, and its decision could not stand.
[Thanks
to Angharad Davies of Dere Street Barristers for preparing
this case summary]
Is a tribunal entitled to take into
account an otherwise unsuccessful internal appeal that purports to change the
effective date of termination (EDT)?
Yes,says the EAT in Hawes & Curtis v Arfan & Mirza.
This was a decision arising out of the Claimants being summarily dismissed on 5
October 2010. They appealed under the internal disciplinary procedure. The
dismissal was upheld but they were told, by letter, that their EDT would be the
date of the appeal decision (4 November 2010). They were paid until this date.
The tribunal held that the EDT was 4 November.
Claim forms were lodged citing the EDT as 4 November, this was challenged by
the Respondent. By a majority decision the tribunal held that the EDT was 4
November. The Respondent appealed, arguing that the EDT for the purposes of s
97(1) ERA 1996 is to be determined objectively and crystallised at the date
when the summary dismissal is communicated. It cannot be varied by appeal. The
Claimant placed reliance on the decision of Gisda Cyf v Barratt [2010] ICR 1475
in arguing the variation of the employer's decision at appeal was
determinative.
The EAT dismissed the appeal: the tribunal found that this was a relatively
rare case where the Respondent intended to change, and did change, the EDT.
Nonetheless, the starting point in a dismissal without notice is the 'date on
which the termination took effect'. The provision of an internal appeal is
integral to the protection of employment rights which underlies the purpose of
s 97(1) and can be considered if relevant to proceedings.
Can
an employer put an employee through a second disciplinary procedure, for the
same offence, on the grounds that the original disciplinary procedure didn't
impose a serious enough sanction?
Yes, in exceptional circumstances, says the Employment Appeal Tribunal in Christou & Ward v Haringey, a case stemming from the
death of Baby P in 2007.
Ms Ward was the social worker responsible for Baby P. Ms Christou was her supervisor,
whom Sharon Shoesmith promised would not lose her job over the death of Baby P.
Both employees were put through Haringey's 'Simplified Disciplinary Procedure'.
The maximum penalty under the Simplified Disciplinary Procedure was a written
warning, which they both duly received.
Subsequently, after the media storm, the OFSTED inspection and the sacking of
Sharon Shoesmith, the new regime at Haringey commenced a second set of
disciplinary proceedings against them arising out of the same facts. They were
dismissed. They argued that it was legally impermissible, or simply unfair, to
dismiss based upon a disciplinary offence for which they had already been
sanctioned.
The EAT (Slade J presiding) upheld the majority decision of the employment
tribunal that the dismissals were not unfair. It held there was no concept of
'double jeopardy' or 'res judicata' in internal disciplinary proceedings. It
held that whilst it would be unusual for a second set of disciplinary
proceedings to follow a first set arising out of the same facts, this was a
'rare' case and the tribunal was entitled to hold that the employer's actions
were fair in the light of the media spotlight and the new management regime
which took a different view of the seriousness of the employees' conduct (see
para 112).
[Thanks
to Catriona Stirling of Cloisters for preparing this case
summary]
Is an employer entitled to withhold a
payment in lieu of notice if it dismisses an employee under an express term in
his service agreement which provides for summary termination with pay in lieu,
but later discovers that the employee had committed gross misconduct prior to
the dismissal?
No, says the Court of Appeal in Cavanagh
v William Evans Ltd.
The company decided that Mr Cavenagh was redundant and summarily terminated his
service agreement, which provided for six months of pay in lieu of notice. It
subsequently discovered that Mr Cavenagh was guilty of gross misconduct
pre-termination and did not make the payment. Had it known about the gross
misconduct when it exercised its contractual power, it would have accepted the
repudiatory breach of the service agreement and regarded itself as discharged
from liability for pay in lieu of notice.
The Court of Appeal held that Mr Cavanagh had acquired an accrued right to the
payment, as his contract had been summarily terminated under the relevant
contractual provision. There was no provision in the service agreement denying
him the right to the payment in lieu if the company subsequently discovered
that he had committed a prior act of gross misconduct. Nor was there any
general principle of contract law barring or extinguishing his right to recover
the pay in lieu as a debt from the company. The principle that a claim for
wrongful dismissal could be defeated by relying on evidence of misconduct
discovered after the dismissal did not provide the company with a defence to a
debt claim.