Thursday, 10 March 2016

Late Application For Reconsideration

Thanks to Jennifer Danvers of Cloisters for preparing this case summary.
Is it an error of law to allow a late application for reconsideration without giving a Respondent a chance to make representations?

Yes (unsurprisingly), held the EAT in The Practice Surgeries Ltd & Secretary of State for Health v Dr Srivatsa.

The employment tribunal failed to dispose of an application made in 2011 by the first Respondent for dismissal of the Claimant's claim and judgment following withdrawal. The Claimant issued proceedings in the High Court in 2012 and, in 2014, the first Respondent reiterated its request for dismissal of the employment tribunal claim. In October 2014 the Employment Judge dismissed the claim, three years after the initial application.

The Claimant made an application for reconsideration of the dismissal in February 2015. This was granted by the Employment Judge who revoked her previous order dismissing the claim.

Mrs Justice Slade, allowed the appeal against the revocation order on the following grounds:

- the employment tribunal had failed to invite a response from the second Respondent to the application for reconsideration (contrary to Rule 72 Employment Tribunal Rules 2013);

- The second Respondent was not sent the revocation order (contrary to Rule 60 Employment Tribunal Rules 2013);

- The Employment Judge had failed to give any reasons for allowing an extension of time of nearly 100 days in relation to the Claimant’s application to reconsider; and

- the employment tribunal had erred in allowing the reconsideration on the basis that the Claimant’s view was not known at the time of dismissing the claim when the employment tribunal had, in fact, been made aware of the Claimant’s objections to the 2011 application.

Mrs Justice Slade held that the October 2014 order dismissing the claim stood, despite the Claimant's objections in relation to the time elapsed between the initial application and judgment.

Salary Sacrifice schemes can be discontinued during maternity leave

Thanks to Karen Jackson of didlaw for preparing this case summary
Is it discriminatory to discontinue childcare vouchers during maternity leave?

No, held the EAT in Peninsula Business Services v Donaldson.

Women on maternity leave are entitled to non-pay benefits pursuant to the Maternity and Parental Leave Regulations 1999. Following HMRC guidance that contractual non-cash benefits provided under a salary sacrifice scheme must continue to be provided during ordinary maternity leave, an employment tribunal held that it must be discriminatory for an employee to lose childcare vouchers during maternity. PBS appealed.

The EAT allowed the appeal and substituted a decision that the claim should be dismissed. No legislative basis had been found to support the HMRC guidance. The key question was: did the vouchers constitute remuneration? If they did Regulation 9 of the Regulations did not require this to continue during maternity leave. Langstaff J held that the vouchers did represent part of salary since pay had been substituted with vouchers under a salary sacrifice scheme. On this basis they were to be regarded as remuneration and could be discontinued during maternity leave.

Wednesday, 9 March 2016

Annual Compensation Limit Increase

BIS has made The Employment Rights (Increase of Limits) Order 2016, containing the annual increases in compensation payments, before Parliament. It applies to dismissals (or detriments, etc) occurring on or after 6 April 2016.

The main changes (and they're not going to break the bank) are:-
 
  • a week's pay - £479 (currently £475)
  • maximum compensatory award - £78,962 (currently £78,335)

Friday, 4 March 2016

EHRC on Discriminatory Advertising


The Equality and Human Rights Commission has published new guides on advertising, for organisations who advertise jobs or services.

They include some guidance, a checklist and an FAQ document.

They're written in plain English, and tackle an often underlooked area of discrimination law.

Thursday, 3 March 2016

Supreme court re-examines vicarious liability

Thanks to Angharad Davies of St. Pauls Chambers for preparing this case summary
What sort of relationship has to exist between an individual and a Defendant before the Defendant can be made vicariously liable in tort for the conduct of that individual? And what is the connection between that relationship and the wrongdoer's act or default (such as to make it just that the Defendant should be held legally responsible to the claimant for the consequences of the wrongdoer's conduct)?

A relationship other than employment is in principle capable of giving rise to vicarious liability provided certain conditions are met and there is nothing wrong with the traditional close connection test if properly employed held the Supreme Court in (1) Cox v Ministry of Justice and (2) Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets plc.

Mrs Cox, was working as a catering manager at Swansea Prison, when a prisoner working in the kitchen accidentally dropped a bag of rice on her, causing injury. She brought proceedings against the Ministry of Justice on the basis that the prison service, one of its executive agencies, was vicariously liable. The prisoner was not an employee but was required to work in the prison, he had been specifically selected to work in the kitchen and his work was carried out under the direction of the prison staff. Therefore his work formed part of the operation of the prison providing meals for his fellow prisoners.

In 2008 Mr Mohamud stopped at a petrol station he was on way to London wanted to print some documents from a USB stick. He enquired at a kiosk to see if they could help. The petrol station was part of Morrisons Supermarkets and their employee, Mr Kahn, was behind the counter. Mr Khan was rude to Mr Mohamud. Mr Kahn ordered him off premises with a torrent of threatening and racist abuse. Mr Mohamud returned to his car, he was followed by Mr Khan but before he could drive off Mr Kahn opened the passenger door and punched him on the head. Mr Mohamud got out to close the door and Mr Kahn continued to assault him.

In Cox, the Court held that a relationship other than employment is in principle capable of giving rise to vicarious liability provided certain conditions are met. First, harm must be wrongfully done by a person who carries on activities as an integral part of the business or operation carried on by the Defendant for its benefit and second, the risk of a wrongful act being committed must be caused by the Defendant assigning activities to the person in question.

In Mohamud, the Court traced the history of the development of the law of vicarious liability and concluded that there is nothing wrong with the close connection test properly applied. In a case such as this the court is to ask itself two questions, firstly, what field of activities was entrusted to the employee or what was nature of job, which is to be answered broadly. Secondly, whether there was sufficient connection between the field of activities carried out by employee for it to be just for the employer to be responsible.

In this case the violence was a re-enforcement of Mr Kahn’s order to leave the premises which was sufficiently connected to the job assigned to him that the employer should be held responsible.

The implications of this go beyond prisons as the Supreme Court has now accepted that vicarious liability can arise where there is no contract of employment but where activities are undertaken that are integral to the business. This approach may be relevant in the context of many modern work places where workers may be part of work force but without having a contract of employment with it.

Friday, 26 February 2016

Employment Tribunal Fees


The Supreme Court has, this morning, granted permission to Unison to appeal the Court of Appeal's decision rejecting Unison's judicial review of the employment tribunal fee regime.

Wednesday, 24 February 2016

Tribunals' Annual Report

The Senior President of the Tribunals has published his Annual Report.

The following points are relevant to employment practitioners:-
 
  • last year was the 50th anniversary of the establishment of employment tribunals;
  • at pages 97-100 of the report, there is a very good summary of the interesting cases of the year;
  • employment tribunals lost a number of salaried employment judges through retirement, but there was no recruitment of salaried or fee-paid judges to replace them, leading to a reduction in judicial numbers
  • the number of EAT appeals last year was about 45% of those pre-fees (July 2013)
  • a drop in the last six years from 60% of EAT litigants being professionally represented, to just 40% being professionally represented
  • various options arising from devolution of the Scottish employment tribunal system are set out.

Monday, 22 February 2016

Holiday Pay: Full Lock Decision available

Thanks to Karen Jackson of didlaw for preparing this case summary
Can domestic legislation be interpreted in a way which conforms to EU law on holiday pay?

Yes, held the EAT in Lock v British Gas, upholding the submissions of UNISON legal who represented Mr Lock.

Domestic legislation is contained in the Working Time Regulations 1998 ('WTR') and sections 221-224 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. European Union law is contained in Council Directive 2003/88/EC, the Working Time Directive.

The right to paid leave is a pillar of EU social law from which there can be no derogation.

Mr Lock was paid basic salary and results-based commission but only basic pay during leave. A reference was made to the CJEU. An employment tribunal held that results-based commission must be included when calculating holiday pay and that it was possible to read words into the WTR. British Gas appealed.

The EAT dismissed the appeal. It is permissible - and indeed necessary - to imply words into the WTR to comply with EU law. Parliament's intention must have been to comply with EU law. Following Bear Scotland (concerning guaranteed overtime), the EAT saw no reason to depart from the reasoning of Langstaff J. The EAT considered a number of other authorities including the Court of Appeal decisions in Bamsey and Evans but concluded that Bear is correct. The EAT is not bound by its own previous decisions but they are persuasive and may only be departed from if manifestly wrong or in other exceptional circumstances. Such departure could not be justified.

Thursday, 18 February 2016

Employment Tribunal Postponements


Thanks to Naomi Cunningham of Outer Temple Chambers
In January 2015, the Government published a consultation on proposed amendments to the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure to do the following:

- limit the number of postponements to hearings that may be allowed to two per party, save in exceptional circumstances (or where the other party is at fault, or both parties want the case postponed in order to facilitate settlement negotiations);

- require applications for postponement to be made at least 7 days before the hearing, save in exceptional circumstances;

- oblige the employment tribunal to consider a costs or preparation time order where an application is made less than 7 days before the hearing.

This was a non-solution to a non-problem. The nearest the consultation came to identifying any evidence that multiple postponements are a causing serious difficulties in the employment tribunal system is a vague assertion that ‘stakeholders’ have ‘voiced concerns’ about the time proceedings can take. Proceedings can take too long, for various reasons. But employment tribunals are already required to exercise their general case management powers in accordance with the overriding objective, which includes avoiding delay. Nothing in the Government response explains how - or even whether - employment tribunals are thought to be getting the balance wrong at present, or how the proposed amendments will improve matters.

Thirty-three organisations and individuals responded to the consultation, most opposed to the changes, and many of them pointing out that the employment tribunals’ case management powers were already adequate to the task of granting postponements when they were necessary, refusing them when they were not, and awarding costs against parties whose unreasonable conduct gave rise to a need to postpone.

In its response published on 15 February 2016, the Government announced its intention to press ahead anyway, in the terms proposed in the consultation.

Tuesday, 16 February 2016

Appeal documents cannot be lodged using Dropbox link

Thanks to Naomi Cunningham of Outer Temple Chambers for preparing this case summary
Can a notice of appeal to the EAT be lodged by sending a link to a Dropbox document?

No, held the EAT in Majekodunmi v City Facilities Management, in a case calculated to charm aficionados of the Postal Rule and its many variants.

The Claimant’s employment tribunal claim had been struck out, and he sought to appeal. On the penultimate day of the 42 day time for appealing, his representative emailed the grounds of appeal and some of the mandatory supporting documents to the EAT. On the last day, instead of sending the remaining documents as attachments to one or more emails, as directed in the relevant EAT guidance (set out in leaflet T440), she sent a link to a zip file on Dropbox.

HHJ Eady agreed with the Registrar that the appeal had not been validly lodged within the 42-day period. The difference between an email attachment and a Dropbox link was clear. In one case, the EAT would have possession of the attachment as soon as it had collected the email - even if it then lost its internet connection. In the other, someone would need to follow the link to an external location and save a copy of the document before the EAT would have possession of it.

Monday, 15 February 2016

Reasonableness of Lay-Off Period

Thanks to Dr John McMullen of Wrigleys Solicitors LLP for preparing this case summary
Is an express power to lay off subject to an implied term of reasonableness?

No, held the EAT in Craig v Bob Lindfield & Sons.

Mr Craig's employment contract allowed for lay off and short-term working for an indefinite period, without pay. After four weeks lay off without pay, he resigned and claimed that he had been constructively dismissed because the lay off had gone on for longer than a reasonable period.

An employment tribunal followed the decision of Kenneth MacRae v Dawson [1984] IRLR 5 (preferring it over the earlier decision of A Dakri & Co Ltd v Tiffen [1981] ICR 256 to the contrary) and held that there was no term to be implied as to reasonableness so far as the length of lay off was concerned, but that if there had been, the period was not unreasonable in all the circumstances of the case. As there was no repudiatory breach of contract, there was no constructive dismissal.

The EAT (Langstaff P presiding) dismissed the appeal, ruling that there was no implied term as contended for. Dawson should be followed unless obviously wrong, and, since it was later in time, and had expressly considered Tiffin, it was in any event to be preferred.

Langstaff P firmly stated that a contract remains a wage/work bargain. If that bargain provides that there are some circumstances in which no money will be paid, no work done, or both, then the failure of the employer to pay in those circumstances will not be a breach of contract. Further, Parliament had provided a scheme for balancing the rights and interests of employer and employee on those occasions where both were adversely affected by a downturn in business. The Employment Rights Act 1996, s148 provides for a period of lay off or short time working (LOST) during which there is no entitlement to claim a redundancy payment. But, after the period of LOST prescribed by ERA s148(2), an employee can serve a notice claiming a payment. For this additional reason this left no room for the implied term in the employment contract advanced by Mr Craig.

Langstaff P did not rule out (see para 46) a constructive dismissal claim based on the employer's breach of the duty of trust and confidence (for example if the employer's desire to maximize profits resulted in behaviour calculated to damage or destroy the relationship of trust and confidence). But this did not arise in the present case.

Friday, 12 February 2016

Important: Gender Pay Reporting

The Government has published the draft The Equality Act (Gender Pay Gap Information) Regulations 2016.

Now intended to come into force in October 2016 (with the first reports to be published in April 2017), the draft Regulations set out the framework for the new gender pay reporting requirements.  Employers will be required to publish mean and median pay information gleaned from the whole workforce.  They must also publish how many men and women appear in each quartile of pay in the workforce.

The full pay report information must be published on the employer's website every year, and left there for at least three years, and must also upload the information to the Government.  The Government's initial intent is for employers who do not comply to be 'named and shamed', and will review whether civil or criminal penalties for non-compliance should be introduced in due course.

The draft Regulations are open for consultation until 11 March 2016.

View all documents from the Government Equalities Office.

Thursday, 11 February 2016

TUPE

Who hates TUPE? Raise your hand now…

In Mustafa v Trek Highway Services, the Employment Appeal Tribunal has ruled on an appeal which was - essentially - a case turning on its own facts.

But it’s a good decision to read if you’re a TUPEphile or suffer from TUPEphobia, as it reviews many well-established TUPE principles in an easy-to-understand way.

Thursday, 4 February 2016

Apprenticeship Levy

The Government has published the draft legislation introducing the apprenticeship levy, expected to come into force in April 2017.

The levy is on UK employers to fund new apprenticeships. The levy will be charged at a rate of 0.5% of an employer’s paybill. Each employer will receive an allowance of £15,000 to offset against their levy payment - meaning it won't be payable by employers with a payroll under £3 million.

Spotted the year it's coming in? 2017. So I won't be talking about it at the Employment Law MasterClass 2016. But I will be covering some excellent stuff that you need to know about for this year.
 

Wednesday, 3 February 2016

Disability Discrimination: Meaning of 'Day to Day' Activities

Thanks to Ed McFarlane of Deminos HR for preparing this case summary
Are 'warehouse operations', such as manually lifting and moving cases of up to 25 kg, 'normal day-to-day activities' for the purposes of disability under the Equality Act 2010?

Yes, held the EAT overturning an employment tribunal's decision in Banaszczyk v Booker.

The Claimant, a picker in a distribution centre, had been found not to be disabled at a preliminary hearing. The Employment Judge, having accepted medical evidence regarding the Claimant's long-term back condition, considered that it did not have a substantial adverse effect on his carrying out 'normal day-to-day activities' as its impact was limited to manual lifting of items of up to 25kg at work, which the Employment Judge regarded as not being a 'normal day-to-day' activity.

The EAT disagreed, noting that the scope of 'normal day-to-day activities' extended to warehouse work (and work generally). So, on the evidence accepted by the employment tribunal, the only conclusion was that the Claimant was a disabled person.

The EAT cautioned against regarding a work rate, such as a warehouse 'pick rate', as an impaired activity, e.g. a target of moving 210 cases per hour, but rather to look at the impairment of the activity itself, e.g. the lifting and moving of cases.

Tuesday, 2 February 2016

Whistleblowing - Prescribed People

A qualifying disclosure will normally be protected, for whistleblowing purposes, if made to the employer. It will also be protected if made to a 'prescribed person' and is within their remit, and if the information disclosed within it is substantially true.

The Government has updated its list of prescribed persons, to whom a protected disclosure can be made.